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STATE OF UTAH 
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STATE OF UTAH, MORONI L. 
JENSEN, as President of the 
Utah State Senate and as 
Vice-Chairman of the 
Legislative 1-ianagement 
Committee of the Forty-Second 
Legislature of the State of 
Utah, and GLADE M. SOWARDS, 
as Speaker of the Utah State 
House of Representatives 
and as Chairman of the 
Management Committee of the 
Forty-Second Legislature of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
* * * * * * * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
* * * * * * * 
No. 16034 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment as to the 
validity of the laws passed by the Forty-Second Utah State 
Legislature and as to the eligibility of teachers for membership 
in the Legislature. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was disposed of in· the trial court by summary 
judgments brought both by Plaintiff and by Defendants. From 
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that portion of the judgment favorable to Plaintlff, Defendants 
appeal. There is no cross-appeal by Plaintiffs on that part of 
the judgment favorable to Defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of that part of the trial court's 
judgment favorable to Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 10, 1977, Governor Scott !1. Matheson convened 
the 1977-1978 Utah State Legislature. The Legislature had among 
its members several teachers or school administrators. The 
Legislature enacted a number of laws during its 1977-1978 
session. 
On August 9, 1978, Plaintiff brought a declaratory action 
in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, seeking to 
have declared invalid all laws passed by the 1977-1978 Utah 
State Legislature on the basis that the Legislature was improperly 
constituted in violation of the Utah State Constitution which 
provides that certain persons may not be members of the Legisla-
ture. 
Pursuant to motions for summary judgment brought by both 
Plaintiff and Defendants, the trial court ruled that: 
l. The Court had jurisdiction; 
2. Plaintiff had standing to bring the action; 
-2-
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3. Article VI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution pro-
hibits educators and school teachers employed in the utah 
Public School System from simultaneously being members of the 
Utah Legislature; 
4. The Forty-Second Utah Legislature was properly con-
stituted and seated and was a de facto Legislature; 
5. All laws enacted by the Forty-Second Legislature are 
valid and in full force and effect; 
6. All monies collected by the Forty-Second Legislature 
should not be returned to the people. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATURE IS NOT THE EXCLUSIVE JUDGE 
OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES 
FOR THE LEGISLATURE 
Defendants contend that the judiciary has no jurisdiction to 
pass upon the eligibility of candidates for the State Legislature. 
They cite as authority for this contention Article VI, Section 
10, Utah State Constitution (all cites are to the Utah Constitu-
tion unless otherwise indicated), which provides as follows: 
Each House shall be the judge of the election 
and qualifications of its members, and may 
punish them for disorderly conduct, and with 
the concurrence of two-thirds of all of the 
members elected, expel a member for cause. 
Defendants read this constitutional provision as making the 
Legislature the sole and exclusive judge of all questions 
-3-
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affecting membership in the Legislature. By its very language, 
however, this constitutional provision is limited to questions 
relative to the election and qualification of the Legislature's 
members. This appeal deals only with the portion of the trial 
court's summary judgment which holds that teachers may not be 
members of the Legislature. That portion of the summary judg-
ment appealed from deals with the eligibility of candidates for 
the Legislature, and not with actual members of the Legislature. 
Ellison v. Barnes, 23 Utah 183, 63 P.899 (1901), is not 
dispositive of this appeal. In Ellison, the Utah Supreme Court 
was asked to decide an election contest arising from alleged 
voting irregularities. The Court declined to decide the election 
for the reason that Article VI, Section 10, granted the Legis-
lature exclusive jurisdiction to decide election contests. 
Ellison does not deal with the eligibility of candidates for the 
Legislature. 
Courts of sister states have ruled on the scope of a 
Legislature's jurisduction to decide questions of candidacy for 
membership in the body. In State v. Dubuque, 68 Wash. 2d 553, 
413 P.2d 972 (1966), the Washington Supreme Court was asked to 
construe the effect of a constitutional provision similar to 
Article VI, Section 7, prohibiting a legislator from being 
elected or appointed to an office created by the Legislature of 
which he was a part. The Washington Legislature had passed laws 
increasing the salaries of representatives and new senators 
for the upcoming session of the Legislature. Suit was brought 
by a taxpayer-elector to determine whether members of the 39th 
-4-
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Washington Legislature would be eligible for reelection to the 
40th Legislature. Like Defendants here, the appellants in 
Dubuque asserted that the Legislature was the exclusive judge of 
the eligibility of its members. The trial court took the 
position that the constitutional provision relating to the in-
house judiciary function of the Legislature did not bar it from 
construing another constitutional provision directed at the 
eligibility of candidates for the Legislature. The Supreme 
Court affirmed, pointing out that the case before it did not 
concern members of the Legislature but rather candidates for 
the Legislature. 
The Court in Dubuque, supra, appended a footnote to its 
opinion, pointing out the folly of vesting a Legislature with 
exclusive jurisdiction as to all questions of membership therein: 
We apprehend a grave danger to our democratic 
institutions if it be the inexorable rule 
that, without regard to concepts of fair play 
and due process of law, the House and Senate 
of either the State Legislature or the 
Congress have exclusive jurisdiction to 
disqualify and unseat members thereof and 
that the courts are completely powerless in 
the premises. Conceding the separation of 
powers to be one of the keystones of freedom, 
we note among other dangers that, should the 
courts be deemed utterly without jurisdiction, 
one political party can, if ruthlessly bent 
upon destruction of its opposition, disqualify 
and unseat all of its opposing members. 413 
P.2d at 977, n.S. 
This Court, like the Washington Court, should not construe 
Article VI, Section 10, to divest it of jurisdiction to construe 
another constitutional provision relating to the eligibility of 
candidates for membership in the Utah Legislature. 
-5-
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In Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251. 473 P.2d 872 (1970), the 
Hawaii Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality 
of a statutory provision requiring a candidate to be a resident 
three years before seeking election to the House of Repr~senta-
tives. The statutory provision tied in with a constitutional 
provision regarding eligibility for membership in the State 
Legislature. The petitioner contended that a construction of the 
provision by a court would be a usurpation of the exclusive 
constitutional right of the State Legislature to pass upon 
questions of eligibility of its members. The court rejected this 
idea, basing its holding on Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 
S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969): 
The precise question has not been before the 
United States Supreme court. However, we 
think there is clear indication in Powell v. 
McCormack . . . that if the question is 
presented to it, it will rule that the power 
of each House to judge the qualifications of 
its members does not include the power to 
construe the constitutional provision on 
qualifications contrary to the construction 
of the court. 473 P.2d at 876. 
The question before this Court concerns the construction of a 
constitutional provision specifically excluding certain persons 
from membership in the Legislature. It would be ludicrous to 
suggest that the Legislature may assume a judicial role and 
interpret Article VI, Section 6, relating to the eligibility of 
candidates to the Legislature. The Legislature may have ex-
elusive jurisdiction to decide upon the election and qualifi-
cation of its members once they are members, but that small grant 
-6-
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of judicial power does not make the Legislature a partner with 
the Judiciary in interpreting the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 
390, 265 P.2d 447 (1953), was called upon to issue a writ of quo 
warranto to oust a person claiming a right to be seated in the 
State Senate. The case arose when an amendment to the Arizona 
Constitution provided that there would be two senators from 
Apache County. Prior to the adoption of the amendment, Apache 
County only had one senator. The Governor, thinking that the 
adoption of the new amendment created a vacancy in the term of 
one of the senators, appointed Defendant Lockhart to serve as 
senator from Apache County. The Supreme court of Arizona decided 
that the question was justicable under a quo warranto proceeding 
despite the constitutional provision making the Legislature the 
judge of elections and qualifications of its members. The Court 
held: 
Nor is this exercise of jurisdiction by the 
courts an encroachment upon the power of the 
Legislature to judge the qualifications of 
its own members. 265 P.2d at 450. 
In Powell v. McCormack, 395 u.s. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 
L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969), the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the trial court and the court of appeals in their 
holdings that the Federal Judiciary was without jurisdiction to 
decide the propriety of an exclusionary order vacating the House 
seat of Representative Adam Clayton Powell. The Court found 
jurisdiction because the questions before the Court involved 
construction of constitutional provisions and such an exercise 
-7-
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by the Judiciary would not be a usurpation of the adjudicatory 
power reserved to the House of Representatives to determine 
qualification of its members. The Court pointed out: 
[A] determination of petitioner Powell's 
right to sit would require no more than an 
interpretation of the Constitution. Such a 
determination falls within the traditional 
role accorded courts to interpret the law, 
and does not involve a "lack of the respect 
due [a] coordinate [branch] of government'" 
nor does it involve an "initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion." 395 u.s. at 548. 
In the instant matter Defendants seek to convince this Court 
that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter 
before it. They contend that Article VI, Section 10, makes the 
State Legislature the exclusive judge of its members. Plaintiff 
does not argue that the Legislature may not judge the qualifi-
cations or the election returns of members once they are elected. 
However, the matter before the Court involves an interpretation 
of other constitutional provisions. It has always been the 
prerogative of the judiciary to interpret and construe consti-
tutional provisions. A grant of limited judicial power to the 
Legislature to deal with its own members does not deprive this 
Supreme Court of its role as interpreter of the Constitution. 
The matter at bar involves eligibility for candidacy to the 
Legislature, it deals with the qualifications of a potential 
member of the Legislature and not of an actual member. This 
Court has jurisdiction to decide the issues before it. 
-8-
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POINT II 
STATE LEGISLATORS MAY NOT 
SIMULTANEOUSLY HOLD TEACHING POSITIONS 
IN UTAH PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The court below found that Article VI, Section 6, (See 
Appendix) , would be violated if administrators and teachers 
could simultaneously be members of the Utah State Legislature. 
Defendants propose that the words "public office," as used 
therein, are to be narrowly construed so as not to encompass 
teachers employed by the state system of public schools. 
There are numerous cases giving a definition of public 
officer. The Supreme Court of Utah has itself on occasion dealt 
with the question of what constitutes a public office. For 
example, in Dull v. Mining Company, 28 Utah 467,79 P.lOSO (1905), 
this Court denied a court reporter additional compensation for 
reporting a lengthy trial. The Court found that a court reporter 
was a public officer and that public officers are entitled only 
to compensation as fixed by law, so that any contract for 
additional compensation in the performance of official duties 
would be void as against public policy. 
In a more recent case, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
membership on a Legislative Council constituted the holding of 
civil office, and that, therefore, a legislator could not hold 
such office because of the prohibition of Article VI, Section 6. 
Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d 226 469 P.2d 497 (1970). It should 
be noted that the Legislative Council had been created by the 
Utah Legislature and was to consist of sixteen members drawn 
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from the members of the Legislature itself. ~his Court con-
strued the word "public office of profit" in a very broad manner 
so as to include members of the Legislature itself. If the 
Court was willing to construe "public office" in a manner which 
would eliminate in-house membership, how much more then should 
the Court be willing to hold that the commingling of the role of 
a LegiElator with that of a member of another branch of the 
government is unhealthy. 
The Territorial Supreme Court in McCornick v. Thatcher, 8 
Utah 294, 30 P.l091 (1892), discussed various definitions of 
public officer found in the authorities. The Court cited this 
broad definition from State v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 59: 
A "public office" is an agency for the state, 
and the person whose duty it is to perform 
this agency is a "public officer." This we 
consider to be the true definition of a 
"public officer" in its original broad sense. 
The essense of it is the duty of performing 
an agency; that is, of doing some act or 
acts, or series of acts, for the state. 8 
Utah at 301, 30 P. at 1093. 
In McCornick, the Court was called upon to decide whether 
trustees of the Territorial College could be considered public 
officers. The Court held that they were such. 
Case law abounds with discussions of the meaning of the 
words "public officer." In 1892 the Supreme Court of Utah 
noted: 
The definitions of the term "office," as given 
by the text writers and courts, are not in 
entire harmony. . HcCornick v. Thatcher, 
8 Utah at 301, 30 P. at 1093. 
-10-
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Almost a century later it can be said that the muddied waters of 
semantics have not cleared. There is still no harmony in the 
definitions of "public officer." 
Members of school boards and the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction are officers. In 53-l-ll, Utah Code Ann., the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction is referred to as "the chief 
state school officer." That members of the State Board of 
Education hold a public office is demonstrated by the elaborate 
election procedure specified in 53-2-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
So prominent a public office is membership on the State Board of 
Education that the candidates' names appear on the same ballots 
with candidates for the United States Senate and the Utah Senate. 
The Superintendent of Public Instruction is identified as 
the "executive officer of the board [of education]," in 53-2-1, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 5 of that Chapter provides that "the 
State Superintendent shall present to the Governor a report of 
the Administration of the System of Public Instruction." There 
is a further requirement in 53-3-9, Utah Code Ann., that the 
Superintendant shall file monthly itemized expense account 
statements to the State Board of Examiners. The State Board of 
Examiners consists of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and 
the Attorney General under 63-6-1, Utah Code Ann. All of these 
statutory provisions locate the entire Public School System and 
its members within the executive branch of the state government. 
Members of County Boards of Education are also officers, 
53-6-3, Utah Code Ann., and are clearly part of the executive 
-ll-
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branch of government in that they report to the State Superin-
tendent, 53-6-13, Utah Code Ann., who, as pointed out above, 
reports to the State Board of Examiners. 
The final link in the chain of command from teachers to the 
Governor is provided in the "Educational Professional Practices 
Act", 53-50-l, et seq., Utah Code Ann. That chapter provides 
that the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall appoint 
members to a professional practices commission. These members 
come from "professional personnel" within the educational system 
and "classroom teachers." The commission serves as a regulatory 
agency within the teaching profession itself. 
It is clear that, whether the term "officer'' is used or not, 
Utah statutes place the educational system squarely within the 
executive branch of government. This case should not turn on the 
meaning of "public office." For this Court to lose sight of the 
underlying issue at bar by sinking in the quagmire of the seman-
tics of "public office" would be to ignore the underpinnings of 
the constitutional provisions in question here. Constitutional 
provisions such as Article VI, Section 6, and Section 7, were 
designed as specific implementations of a more general constitu-
tional prohibition contained in Article V, Section 1. That 
provision is the traditional statement of the doctrine of Separa-
tion of Powers. It provides: 
The powers of the government of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, the executive, 
and the judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
-12-
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functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
If Article VI, Section 6, does not prevent teachers from being 
members of the Legislature, it is very clear that the prohibition 
of Article V, Section 1, will prevent Legislators from being 
teachers. The issue in this case is Separation of Powers. 
In State v. Grover, 102 Utah 41, 125 P.2d 807 (1942), this 
Court had the occasion to deal with a case arising under Article 
VI, Section 7. The Court did an exhaustive study of constitu-
tions of sister states with respect to the prohibition against a 
legislator's accepting an office created during the term of his 
membership in the Legislature. The Court lauded decisions from 
other jurisdictions which discussed the evil arising from 
trafficking in public offices. The Court also noted that many 
state constitutions prohibits legislators from having any other 
type of office or employment. The Court made these observations: 
In the study of the various state constitu-
tions it is interesting to note that the newer 
or more recently adopted constitutions, and 
practically all constitutions that have been 
amended on this point since originally adopted, 
have made the inhibition against legislators 
receiving or accepting appointive office more 
rigid, to bar them from any office, even 
though not created by a Legislature of which 
they were members. In california in 1916 the 
people by initiative petition enacted an 
amendment to their constitution, Article IV, 
Section 19, barring legislators from holding 
or accepting any office, trust or employment 
under the State during the term for which they 
were elected to the Legislature. 102 Utah at 48, 
125 P.2d at 810. 
-13-
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The cited opinion shows the keen interest that the Utah Supreme 
Court has demonstrated in the past in keeping the three branches 
of government separate and in assuring that legislators enjoy 
"that independent frame of mind which should be possessed by the 
ideal legislator." 102 Utah at 51, 125 P.2d at 812, quoting from 
Chenoweth v. Chambers, 164 P.428 (Cal. 1917). 
There is no question that the Utah Public School System 
benefits from appropriations made by the Utah State Legislature. 
An educator within the Utah State School System would naturally 
be happy to see his profession advanced by healthy appropriations. 
A teacher-legislator may at times not enjoy that free state of 
mind with regard to legislative determinations which the Utah 
Supreme Court found to be so important in Grover, supra. 
Other states have dealt directly with the question of teachers 
in the legislature. The Alaska Supreme Court examined the question 
in Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968). The wording of 
the Alaska Constitution was broader than the equivalent Utah 
provision. The Alaska Constitution, Article II, Section 5, pro-
vides, in pertinent part: 
No legislator may hold any other office or 
position of profit under the United States or 
the State. 
The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the Separation of Powers 
doctrine mandates a conclusion that teachers hold a position of 
profit under the state, and that, therefore, to allow them to 
sit in the Alaska Legislature would violate the Alaska Consti-
tution. The Court expounded on the reasoning underlying the 
Separation of Powers doctrine: 
-14-
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Alaska's constitutional prohibition against 
members of our three separate branches of 
state government holding any other position 
of profit under the State of Alaska reflects 
the intent to guard against conflicts of 
interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration 
of power, and dilution of separation of 
powers in regard to the exercise by these 
government officials of the executive, judi-
cial and legislative functions of our state 
government. The rationale underlying such 
prohibitions can be attributed to the desire 
to encourage and preserve independence and 
integrity of action, and decision on the part 
of individual members of our state govern-
ment. 441 P.2d at 35. 
Like the Alaska Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court demon-
strated in Grover, supra, that it is concerned about the dilution 
of the separation of powers and its attendant evils. 
The Oregon Supreme Court was faced with the question of 
teachers in the Legislature in Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 
Clackamas County, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957). In that 
case the Oregon Supreme Court held that a legislator duly elected 
was prohibited from exercising his functions as a school teacher 
in a public school district by a constitutional prohibition 
worded almost exactly like the Utah provision found in Article 
v, Section 1. The opinion in Monaghan is very well reasoned. 
The Court refused to find that the words "any functions" were 
synonomous with official duties and pointed out: 
One who performs "official duties" neces-
sarily functions in tasks relating to his 
office, but one who exercises the functions 
of another department is not necessarily 
engaged in the performance of "official 
duties." 315 P.2d at 803. 
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The Oregon Court found that Representative Monaghan was charged 
with the exercise of powers belonging to a senator, but that he 
also performed "functions" belonging to another department of 
government, the executive branch. The Court reasoned that 
education was not a local matter, since the Oregon Constitution 
mandated the establishment of a statewide school system. It also 
found that school districts were quasi-municipal corporations and 
a governmental agency which performed duties imposed on it by 
statute. The Court then reasoned that teachers were employees of 
this state agency. 
The Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 1, also mandates 
establishment of a public school system: 
The Legislature shall provide for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a uniform system 
of public schools, which shall be open to all 
children of the state, and be free from 
sectarian control. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared educational divisior.s to be 
bodies corporate. In Hansen v. Board of Education of Emery 
county School District, 101 Utah 15, 116 P.2d 936 (1941), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A Board of Education is a legal entity created 
by statute. For the purpose of administering 
the affairs relating to schools within a 
designated area, certain limited powers are 
conferred upon boards of education. These 
powers are exercised for the welfare and in 
the interest of the people within the desig-
nated area. 101 Utah at 21, 116 P.2d at 938. 
Lest there be any misunderstanding as to the importance of the 
role of the actual teacher within the framework of the state 
education system and its relation to the executive branch of 
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government, the Oregon Supreme Court in !1onaghan, supra, pointed 
out that a teacher surely occupied a more important place in 
state government than stenographers. It cited Gibson v. Kay, 68 
Or. 589, 137 P.864 (1914), wherein the Oregon Supreme Court had 
earlier found that stenographers and clerks of the corporation 
commissioner were prohibited under the Separation of Powers 
clause in the Oregon Constitution from holding office in other 
departments of government. It will be remembered that the 
Supreme Court of Utah has also declared stenographers to be 
public officers. Dull v. Mining Company, 28 Utah 67, 30 P.l091 
(1905). How much more important the public school teacher is in 
the framework of the Utah State Government than a court reporter. 
~he Oregon Supreme Court in Monaghan, supra, would not 
impute a malevolent motive to Representative Monaghan, but merely 
pointed out that the occasion for abuse must be avoided under the 
Separation of Powers doctrine. The Court found the lower court's 
assessment of the situation admirably stated and incorporated it 
into the opinion: 
Conceivably the school board could say to 
its employee who is serving in the legisla-
ture, "You must vote in favor of certain 
bills that are advantageous to us and which 
increase our authority. If you do, we will 
increase your salary, and if you do not you 
will be penalized in your position in cer-
tain respects." Would this relationship not 
then tend to concentrate power in the branch 
of the government by which the member of the 
legislature was employed and to the detriment 
of the legislative branch? 315 P.2d at 805. 
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Respondent in the case at bar does not impute evil motive to 
educators who desire to be members of the Legislature. Civic 
interest is always to be praised wherever it can be found. But 
the Separation of Powers doctrine is a keystone of democratic 
government as practiced in the United States and to allow a per-
son to commingle his role in one branch with functions and duties 
of another branch would lead to an unholy marriage, anathema in 
the eyes of American governmental tradition. Teachers should not 
be legislators and legislators should not be teachers. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING 
TO BRING THIS ACTION 
Where a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a 
statute the question of standing may arise. Several Utah cases 
have held that "an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be 
made by one whose interests have not been and are not about to be 
prejudiced by its operation." State v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 
49 P.2d 408 (1935). 
There is no hard and fast rule, however, as to what con-
stitutes standing. This is especially true where a plaintiff 
seeks interpretation of a constitutional provision without 
reference to a statute. In such cases the only requirement for 
standing may be that the plaintiff be a taxpayer. For example, 
in Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 
(1966), the court entertained an action for a declaratory judg-
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ment with regard to tax laws promulgated by the state legis-
lature. In a footnote to the opinion the court made reference to 
the usual rule that "one must himself suffer damage or have his 
rights adversely affected before he can question the constitu-
tionality of the statute." 17 Utah 2d at 342, 411 P.2d at 834, 
n. 7. In the same footnote, however, the court admitted that in 
this case it had "met and dealt with the issue here presented." 
Given the gravity of the issue, the court felt that justice would 
best be served by meeting the issues head on rather than evading 
them by holding that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring 
the suit. 
The California Supreme Court has recently ruled that the 
requirement of standing is met when the court is assured that the 
plaintiff before it will vigorously prosecute the issues raised. 
In Harmon v. City and County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 
P.2d 1248 (1972), the court ruled that a taxpayer had standing to 
seek a declaratory judgment on a complaint that the City Director 
of Property was selling city property at prices not reflecting 
their true value. The defendant city claimed that the plaintiff 
did not have standing to bring such a suit. The court held: 
A party enjoys standing to bring his com-
plaint into court if his stake in the resolu-
tion of that complaint assumes the proportions 
necessary to insure that he will vigorously 
present his case. 496 P.2d at 1254. 
The court analyzed the plaintiff's interest and found that, if 
the City could sell property for a higher price, then the municipal 
taxes would be decreased, as would plaintiff's tax burden. This 
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gave the plaintiff sufficient interest in the case to insure 
vigorous prosecution. 
Plaintiff in the instant matter is a taxpayer and an elector. 
As a taxpayer he suffers the burden of increased taxation if the 
legislature, improperly constituted, makes unnecessary and overly 
large appropriations to public education in the state. As an 
elector the power of his vote is diminished when other electors 
are allowed to vote for candidates not eligible to sit in the 
legislature. The very fact that Plaintiff is before this Court 
demonstrates his zeal in prosecuting the suit. 
The United States Supreme Court has also often relaxed the 
standing requirements when the issues presented were worthy of 
the Court's attention. In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 52 S, 
Ct. 397, 76 L. Ed. 795 (1932), the court granted a writ of 
certiorari and reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in a redistricting case filed by a "citizen, elector 
and taxpayer." 285 U.S. at 361. Likewise, where all other 
interested parties to a suit cannot effectively be brought 
before the court, the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
representative plaintiff may bring the suit. In NAACP v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958), the Supreme 
Court allowed the NAACP to assert the rights of individual Negro 
members. The Court noted the general rule as to standing and 
explained its exception in this case: 
To limit the breadth of issues which must be 
dealt with in particular litigation, this 
court has generally insisted that parties 
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rely only on constitutional rig~ts which are 
personal to thenselves. . The principle 
is not disrespected where constitutional 
rights of persons who are not immediately 
before the court could not be effectively 
vindicated except through an appropriate 
representative before the court. 357 U.S. 
at 459. 
In the case at bar the interests of plaintiff in prosecuting this 
action are representative of those of other citizens of Utah who 
are interested in the proper constitution of the Utah Senate. 
Perhaps the most cogent explanation of a court's approach to 
standing where crucial issues are involved was expressed in 
State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P,2d 975 
(1974). There plaintiff brought an original proceeding in the 
New !1exico Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering certain 
state officials to ignore "line item vetoes" made by the Gover-
nor. The court granted the writ of mandamus despite a challenge 
to plaintiff's standing. The court noted that the question of 
standing could not be determined by hard and fast rules. The 
court recognized plaintiff's standing not by virtue of plain-
tiff's civil status, but by virtue of the importance of the 
issues before the court. The court stated: 
[I]t has been clearly and firmly established 
that even though a private party may not have 
standing to invoke the power of this court to 
resolve constitutional questions and enforce 
constitutional compliance, this court, in its 
discretion, may grant standing to private 
parties to vindicate the public interest in 
cases presenting issues of great public 
importance. There is no claim that the 
issues here presented are not of great public 
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interest cr importance, and we consider them 
of sufficiently great importance and interest 
to the public to grant standing to petitioner 
to raise and present them in these proceedings. 
524 P.2d at 979 (emphasis added). 
The issues now before this Court present grave questions of 
public importance. This Court may wish to recognize plaintiff's 
standing to raise these issues on the ground that plaintiff is a 
taxpayer and an elector. Or this Court may simply exercise its 
discretion and grant the plaintiff standing in order to rule on 
important matters. In either case the question of standing 
should not be allowed to interfere with the Court's adjudication 
of the constitutional questions before it. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before this Court involves the Separation of 
Powers doctrine. The case turns on the interpretation of pro-
visions in the Utah Constitution. The Utah Constitution, Article 
VI, Section 10, carves a small slice of judicial power and gives 
it to the legislative branch of government so that it can judge 
the qualifications of its own members. Other constitutional 
provisions such as those in question here, Article VI, Section 6, 
and Article V, Section l, deal with eligibility for candidacy to 
the legislature. Interpretation of constitutional provisions is 
uniquely the function of the Judiciary. This Court has juris-
diction to decide the issues before it. 
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The Utah Educational System and its member-employees are 
inextricably involved in the executive branch of the Utah state 
government. The Utah State Constitution, Article VI, Section 6, 
and Article V, Section 1, are designed to assure the separation 
of powers so that each branch of government may remain untainted 
by intrusions from other branches. To allow teachers to sit in 
the Legislature commingles the functions of two distinct branches 
of the state government and violates the Utah Constitution. 
As taxpayer and elector, the plaintiff has standing to seek 
a judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions. The 
issue before the court is of such magnitude that standing may be 
accorded plaintiff as a matter of law or as a matter of discre-
tion by this Court. 
Plaintiff, Lynn A. Jenkins, therefore prays this Court to 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of September, 1978. 
d:M1tld 8 / :LL JAMES B. LEE fM~at1c_ 
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APPENDIX 
ARTICLE V, SECTION 1: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall 
be divided into three distinct departments, the Legisla-
tive, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the 
cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 6: 
No person holding any public office o f profit or trust 
under authority of the United States, or of this State, 
shall be a member of the Legislature; Provided, That 
appointments in the State Militia, and the offices of 
notary public, justice of the peace, United States 
commissioner, and postmaster of the fourth class, shall 
not, within the meaning of this section, be considered 
offices of profit or trust. 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7: 
No member of the Legislature, during the term for which 
he was elected, shall be appointed or elected to any 
civil office of profit under this State, which shall 
have been created, or the emoluments of which shall 
have been increased, during the term for which he was 
elected. 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 10: 
Each house shall be the judge of the election and 
qualifications of its members, and may punish them for 
disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of two-
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